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The rules governing citizenship are among
the most fundamental topics in international
law and politics. This is, ﬁrst and foremost,
since the Westphalian concept of citizenship is
essentially “an international ﬁling system, a
mechanism for allocating persons to states,”1
and therefore it is a cornerstone of the current
structure of international law.
In At Home in Two Countries, Peter Spiro
Charles R. Weiner Professor of Law at Temple
University, Beasley School of Law addresses
one of the most challenging issues related to the
institution of citizenship: the question whether
dual citizenship should be protected by interna
tional law and perhaps even qualify as a
“human right.” Spiro is one of the leading experts
writing on this topic and should be credited for
being among the ﬁrst scholars who observed the
decline of citizenship and envisaged the global
rise of dual citizenship.2
At Home in Two Countries is intellectually
rich. It shows how dual citizenship, once a repre
hensible institution, has become acceptable, and
advocates the recognition of a human right to
dual citizenship. The book is empirically
grounded the claim is well documented and
convincing and normatively inspiring. Spiro
writes in a way that is accessible to a general audi
ence deep but simple, speciﬁc yet not jargon
ish, legal but relevant to other disciplines
(political theory, citizenship studies, migration,
and transnationalism studies). The reader
becomes familiar with the law of dual citizenship,
but also with its theoretical foundation, historical
development, and normative implications; the
focus is on the United States yet the book is
full of comparative observations. Spiro is a vision
ary he dreams of a world which is more open
and global yet pragmatic; he understands well
the political constraints that will prevent the real
ization of his vision in the near future. Whatever
one’s view on the topic is, Spiro invites us to
think on the essence of citizenship and how the
world could be different if alternative rules
would be adopted. The book offers a timely anal
ysis of a pressing global challenge.
The book is divided into eight chapters.
Chapter 1 focuses on the feudal roots of the mod
ern institution of citizenship. The common law
concept of subjecthood was based on feudal ties
between subjects and the king. Subjects owed a
duty of allegiance to the king and it was abso
lute, perpetual, and indelible. Allegiance was a
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Pub. L
113 150, Aug. 2, 2014, 128 Stat. 1809; that act also
created a joint oversight mechanism by the executive
branch and the Congress.
1 ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD
IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 31 (1992).
2 Peter J. Spiro,Dual Nationality and the Meaning of
Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997).
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matter of natural law due from all people born
within the king’s dominions. Perpetual allegiance
meant that a person could not be naturalized in
another country or dissolve the bond of alle
giance; “once a subject, always a subject.”3
England even brought to justice people who
became naturalized Americans for being “saddled
with allegiance to more than one sovereign”
(p. 13). And yet, the theory of perpetual alle
giance gradually lost validity. The American
Revolution grounded the duty of allegiance in
contract law theory, which is deﬁned by law
and terminated by law, rather than in natural
law. The industrial revolution, growing popula
tion movements, and the rapid diffusion of
Lockean theories of social contract challenged
the concept of perpetual allegiance; eventually,
it “could not survive modernity” (p. 21). In
1870, Britain recognized a right to expatriation
and allowed people to change their citizenship
status and transfer their allegiance to a new
sovereign.
The recognition of the right to expatriation4 in
Britain and the United States was not followed by
the legal option to hold dual citizenship. States
demanded exclusiveness; people could not be
loyal to more than one sovereign at the same
time and had to choose their master (“no man
can serve two masters” (p. 23)). Chapter 2 brings
the story of “jealous nations” that insisted on
exclusive allegiance. In the United States, alle
giance could be transformed, but not divided.
There were two central mechanisms to prevent
dual citizenship. First, naturalization in another
country implied the loss of citizenship in the
country of origin; “[m]ost states came to termi
nate the nationality of individuals who natural
ized elsewhere” (p. 27) or took an oath of
allegiance in a foreign country (p. 33). In addi
tion, children born and raised outside the
United States had to record “their intention to
become residents and remain citizens of the
United States” at the age of majority (p. 34).
Second, individuals who were born as dual citi
zens had to choose between their two statuses
(p. 23). Dual citizenship was perceived as a
“threat to the stability of international relations”
and, consequently, “[s]tates moved aggressively
to root out the status” (id.).
Dual citizenship was particularly seen as a
threat to international stability in time of war.
Chapter 3 documents how the U.S. government
considered dual citizens as “ﬁfth column” during
the World Wars and the Cold War. In 1940,
Congress passed a law according to which
Americans could lose their citizenship “for enter
ing into the armed forces of a foreign state where
an individual possessed the nationality of that
state” (p. 42). Other grounds for losing citizen
ship were “accepting government employment
in a foreign state for which only nationals of
such state were eligible” and voting in a foreign
election (p. 43). The U.S. Supreme Court largely
backed up Congress. In Perez v. Brownell, which
dealt with the issue of voting in a foreign country,
Justice Felix Frankfurter held: “noman should be
permitted deliberately to place himself in a posi
tion where his services may be claimed by more
than one government and his allegiance be due
to more than one.”5 Between 1949 and 1964,
“[m]ore than 25,000 individuals lost their citi
zenship on the voting ground alone” (p. 49).
On the other side of the ocean, the German
Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1974
that “dual or multiple nationality is regarded
. . . as an evil that should be avoided or elimi
nated.”6 States made a great effort to limit dual
citizenship “[o]ne had to pick sides or those
sides would be picked for you” (p. 55).
Chapter 4 explains the turning point toward
the toleration of dual citizenship in the United
States. In 1967, less than a decade after the
Perez decision, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed
its ruling and signaled a wider acceptance of dual
3 William Blackstone characterized it by holding
that an obligation to one’s sovereign represented “a
debt of gratitude, which cannot be forfeited, canceled,
or altered, by any change of time place or circum
stances.” See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 1765, at 369 70 (1979).
4 The right to expatriation is currently recognized by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15(2),
GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
5 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 50 (1958).
6 Judgement of May 21, 1974, 37 BVerfGE 217,
254 55.
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citizenship.7 Other states followed a similar track
“France amended its nationality regime in
1973 to allow retention of French nationality
upon naturalization in another state, as did
Canada in 1976” (p. 70). By 2000, dual citizen
ship became accepted in a large number of coun
tries. Mexico allowed dual citizenship in 1998, as
did Italy, Turkey, Ireland, Israel, and the
Philippines. According to Spiro, in the 1990s,
“[n]ineteen out of the top twenty source states
for immigrants to the United States either accept
dual citizenship or do nothing to police against
it” (id.). States, he ﬁnds, “have largely given up
the ﬁght” over dual nationality and gradually
accepted it, either de jure or de facto (p. 72).8
Chapter 5 shows that, in the past twenty years,
dual citizenship has not only been tolerated but
also encouraged. It turned from a condemned
status to “one that is proudly or casually adver
tised” (p. 74). Spiro brings three reasons for
this transformation. The ﬁrst reason relates to
the cost of dual citizenship for states, which, in
the contemporary world, has become trivial.
According to Spiro, there is no longer a security
risk in holding a dual citizenship, if there ever was
one. The second reason relates to legal changes.
Chapter 5 details how legal barriers, created by
the U.S. Supreme Court, made it hard to revoke
citizenship. In order to remove citizenship, the
government must prove the involvement of a per
son in hostilities against the United States as well
as an intent of that person to expatriate, that is, to
relinquish citizenship. Spiro concludes that,
under these restrictions, “the standard for under
taking a drone strike is lower than for expatria
tion” (pp. 78 79). The third reason relates to a
change in the role of individuals in international
law “[c]itizens are no longer pliable pawns”
(p. 82). Individuals are no longer seen as repre
sentative of their country of origin, a piece of sov
ereignty in their new country. Instead, dual
citizens are considered nowadays as a valuable
“political resource” in the host country (p. 83).
All in all, Spiro concludes that “[d]ual citizenship
is good for America” (p. 86).
Chapter 6 makes a case for dual citizenship. It
is not only good for individuals (human rights)
and receiving countries (inclusion), but also ben
eﬁcial for sending countries. The chapter shows
the shift in countries of emigration, which once
saw emigrants as “traitors” (p. 88) and today con
siders them “economic footholds in developed
economies” that send remittance supporting
“family members left behind” (p. 89). The send
ing countries discovered the economic value of
their diaspora. As a result, countries of emigration
have amended their constitution to allow dual
citizenship Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Columbia, Mexico, South
Korea, and Turkey while other countries,
such as China, stopped enforcing the law against
dual citizenship. The acceptance of dual citizen
ship has also provided political rights for non res
ident dual citizens “[m]ost states now afford
full voting rights to external citizens in national
elections,” either by mail (the United States,
Spain, or Italy) or at the consulates abroad
(Poland, France, or Sweden) (p. 95). In some
countries, non resident communities even have
representation in national legislatures (e.g.,
Italy, France, or Columbia).
Chapter 7 is the core of the book it advo
cates the recognition of a human right to dual cit
izenship. Spiro does not specify whether the
global acceptance of dual citizenship has reached
the point where it can be seen as a “right” based
on customary international law. Rather, he ﬁnds
the justiﬁcations for such a right in three sources.
First, freedom of association: Spiro sees member
ship in another state as a form of political associ
ation that can only be deprived when it is
necessary for protecting national security, public
safety, and individual freedoms. Second, liberal
autonomy: Spiro claims that forcing a child to
choose between countries undermines the
7 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
8 On the growing global legal acceptance of dual cit
izenship, see Yossi Harpaz & Pablo Mateos, Strategic
Citizenship: Negotiating Membership in the Age of
Dual Nationality, J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD.
(Mar. 20, 2018), available at https://www.tandfon
line.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440482?
needAccess=true; Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship
Dataset, Maastricht Center for Citizenship,
Migration and Development, Maastricht University,
at https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/dual cit
database.
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autonomy to have a home in two countries.
Third, political rights: dual citizenship allows a
person to exercise political rights both at the
country of residency, where the person has an
interest to inﬂuence the public life, and the coun
try of origin, where he/she has a political interest
due to property rights, social beneﬁts, and cul
tural ties. The recognition of a right to dual citi
zenship, à la Spiro, “would bar states from
requiring new citizens to renounce their original
citizenship, terminating the citizenship of those
who naturalize elsewhere, or forcing those born
with dual citizens to choose one at majority”
(p. 8). He admits that such a right “is not an
immediate prospect,” but hopes that reality will
foster it.
Chapter 8 discusses how the rise of dual citi
zenship is connected with the decline of citizen
ship in general. This chapter has three powerful
points. First, the acceptance of dual citizenship
is a symptom for the devaluing of citizenship.
In the past, naturalization “reﬂected a reprioriti
zation of identity” yet, today, it is often instru
mental it can occur “even in the absence of
any love for a state of residence” (pp. 134 35);
it is a matter of convenience (“passports will be
more like credit cards” (p. 150)). Citizenship
has become instrumental also for states, which
offer it for sale. Second, dual citizenship redeﬁnes
political boundaries and decouples citizenship
from territory and political communities it
blurs the distinction between “us” and “them”
to the point that it becomes “impossible to say
where one community leaves off and another
takes on” (p. 140). Third, dual citizenship is
mostly available for few privileged people. Spiro
brieﬂy discusses the nexus between dual citizen
ship and global injustice. He recognizes the prob
lem, but dismisses it. For him, dual citizenship is
not the source for global injustice “dual citizen
ship isn’t the problem, citizenship is” (p. 149).
The book provides an insightful contribution
concerning three issues. The ﬁrst relates to the
institution of citizenship. Spiro urges the reader
to reﬂect not only on the rules of dual citizenship,
but also on the institution of citizenship.
Citizenship is an artifact, a creature of govern
ment, and no moral values or human rights
follow from this concept in and of itself. But cit
izenship is far from being an ideal social con
struct. The last century has been characterized
by ﬁerce debates on citizenship regimes
whether the rules to gain or lose the status of cit
izenship are just, whether the status of citizenship
should be central in securing human rights, and
whether the possession of citizenship requires a
conﬁrmation of identity. How empirically
grounded are the propositions underlying the
contemporary institution of citizenship? What
costs and beneﬁts does it generate on the global
level? Who are/should be the main players in
designing the rules of citizenship? What should
be the criteria for regulating citizenship? And
will an author of a citizenship book in 2120 per
ceive existing rules the way we see the common
law rule of perpetual allegiance? At Home in
Two Countries reminds us how even relatively
small changes in exiting citizenship rules can
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the life of millions of
people.
The second issue relates to the politics of citi-
zenship designing rules in order to serve
national, rather than individual interests. The
common law rule of perpetual allegiance was feu
dalist in nature “[s]ubjects were useful as
instruments . . . [and] were to be put to work
as resources[;] . . . expatriation represented an
intolerable loss of strength to the birth sovereign”
(p. 15). Similarly, the backlash against perpetual
allegiance in the United States was aimed at polit
ical interests of the new country. At the infancy of
the nation, “[t]he United States was thirsty for
immigrants” and had to adopt rules encouraging
newcomers to move in (p. 16). Not surprisingly,
as “the United States grew stronger, it had to con
sider how unrestrained expatriation by its own cit
izensmight undermineU.S. interests” and, indeed,
it “later prohibited expatriation by U.S. citizens”
and “at points it limited the right of Americans
to expatriate” (p. 17). In modern history, individ
uals were instruments for political interests and the
rules of citizenship were thereby shaped; “individ
ual interests in the status were ignored” (p. 114).
The third issue relates to the international law
of citizenship. Traditionally, international law
does not regulate citizenship; it defers to state
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authority in setting up citizenship rules. Spiro
shows how thin the international law of citizen
ship is. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
the attempt to regulate citizenship led to the
adoption of The Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conﬂict of Nationality
Laws. The Hague Convention provided that “[i]t
is for each State to determine under its own law
who are its nationals”9 and, while recognizing a
right to expatriation, did not acknowledge a
right to dual citizenship. Spiro indicates some
developments toward an international law of
citizenship.10 Yet, in spite of the legalization, cit
izenship is not explicitly a branch of international
law. International law accepts dual citizenship as
a social reality, yet attempts “to minimize the
ways in which it disrupted the international sys
tem” (p. 61). Dual citizenship is protected, but
states can require a “genuine connection”
between an individual and a state.11 Spiro’s
book, and his scholarship more broadly, is a
plea for an international citizenship law, “the
last bastion of sovereign discretion.”12 The drafts
of the Global Compact on Refugees (March 9,
2018) and the Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration (February 5,
2018) say nothing on dual citizenship, but call
to “[e]nable political participation and engage
ment of migrants in their countries of origin . . .
in elections and political reforms, by establishing
voting registries for citizens abroad, and by parlia
mentary representation.”13 Should international
law regulate citizenship?What can be the theoret
ical justiﬁcations and normative principles for it?
These questions will engage legal scholars in the
years to come and Spiro’s writings will be their
ﬁrst source for inspiration.
Having said that, I have three points of dis
agreement with Spiro. The ﬁrst point touches
upon his statement on the value of citizenship.
Spiro rightly observes that, generally, citizenship
is declining and its value is less central than in the
past decades. Citizenship is less exclusive (not a
single source of identity, rights, and duties), less
supreme (subduing all sources of identities), and
less central (for community cohesion). Dual citi
zenship is just another symptom of a general
trend of liberalization of citizenship.14 But recent
years have shown a backlash a restrictive turn.
In some senses, citizenship is more central
today than one hundred years ago and there are
more transnational regimes and limitations that
depend on it. Thus, the exercise of freedom of
movement outside the state is perhaps connected
with citizenship today more than in the last
centuries. The most visible expression of the
restrictive turn is the rise of “cultural defense
laws” policies aimed at protecting different
expressions of the national culture.15 In
Europe, this has resulted in attempts to enforce
cultural integration through citizenship tests, loy
alty oaths, integration pacts, language demands,
and attachment requirements.16 True, citizen
ship has become instrumental, but there is a
strong backlash against it, which, I believe,
Spiro underestimates. One can reasonably argue
that the more citizenship decreases in value, the
more central the debate over migration becomes.
In the current age, the status of citizenship does
not have much value and non citizen residents
are indeed entitled to welfare beneﬁts, free educa
tion, and social stipends; but precisely because of
these reasons, nation states are more insistent on
border control and on keeping the gates closed.
9 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conﬂict of Nationality Laws, Art. 1, April 12, 1930,
179 LNTS 89.
10 The European Convention on Nationality, Arts.
14, 16, Strasbourg, 6.XI.1997.
11 Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment,
1955 ICJ Rep. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
12 Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of
Citizenship, 105 AJIL 694 (2011).
13 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration 21 (Zero Draft, Feb. 5, 2018), available at
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/intergovernmental
negotiations.
14 CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
31 (2010).
15 LIAV ORGAD, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE OF
NATIONS: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MAJORITY RIGHTS
85 114 (2015).
16 One can argue that access to the status of citizen
ship is becoming more liberal in one sense (who has
access?), but less liberal in another sense (under
which conditions?).
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The second point is related to the human right
to dual citizenship. Spiro provides convincing jus
tiﬁcations for such a right, yet says little on the
conditions that must be fulﬁlled for its realization
and the possible consequences for global justice.
Even readers who agree with his normative direc
tion may insist that the status of citizenship must
not be regarded as purely instrumental; rather,
some “genuine links” between a person and a
state must be established, a doctrine that is still
good law.17 Spiro’s personal story emphasizes
this point. Spiro is an American citizen who
became a naturalized German in 2013. He does
not speak German, knows little about German
history, politics, and culture, and rarely visits
Germany.18 He is a German citizen in title,
rather than in practice (“I can hardly call myself
a German in any real way. . . . I would never iden
tify myself as German, or even as German
American” (p. 3)). Getting German citizenship
was a matter of convenience, for having better
prices in museums and shorter lines at airports.
In summer 2008, he visited Rome where he
found that “Museums in Italy can be expensive,
and there is no discount for children at least not
for non EU citizen children. Never again was I
going to dig so deeply into my wallet with my
German passport toting son and daughter”
(p. 2). So, he admits, “my motivation was instru
mental” (id.), in part “to avoid lines at European
ports of entry and to exploit EU only discounts at
continent museums” (p. 131). One does not
need to adopt a romantic conception of citizen
ship e.g., love for a country to object to the
idea that international law should encourage cit
izenship distribution for purely instrumental rea
sons.19 Spiro sees no problem with that; after all,
his story proves his thesis that citizenship is
becoming less of an issue (“Naturalizing as
German took on an analytical element, an exer
cise I could use to prove the rectitude of my
scholarly theorizing” (p. 2)). But Spiro’s story
also shows the opposite. Unlike the title of the
book, At Home in Two Countries, Spiro considers
only one country as a “home” (the United States)
and sees the other country (Germany) more as a
“hotel.”20
The third point relates to the assumptions
underlying international citizenship law. Spiro’s
endorsement of dual nationality is based upon
some hypotheses. One of them relates to its pos
sible cost, which, according to him, does not
exist. There is no evidence, he says, that “foreign
countries have tried to exploit dual nationals to
their national advantage” (p. 82). Even in times
of war, dual citizens “were not much of a prob
lem” and, in any event, such a threat is
“far fetched” today and just “implausible”
(pp. 76 77). Spiro, I believe, underestimates
the challenge. There is a wide literature on states’
exploitation of dual citizens for national advan
tages,21 and the recent case in which the
Turkish President Erdoğan considered German
citizens with Turkish passports as his constitu
ency is a reminder for the possible threat to inter
national order. Perhaps more acute is Spiro’s
underestimation of the nexus between dual citi
zenship to global (in)equality and (in)justice.
Dual citizenship generates global inequality;
those who are likely to have it are those who
can economically afford it.22 An international
17 In a recent article, Rainer Bauböck demonstrates
how international law can keep both open citizenship,
which is easier to acquire, and the “genuine links” doc
trine. See Rainer Bauböck, Genuine Links and Useful
Passports: Evaluating Strategic Uses of Citizenship,
J. ETHNIC &MIGRATION STUD. (Mar. 20, 2018), avail
able at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.
1080/1369183X.2018.1440495.
18 Spiro’s case is special his father was a German
who ﬂed Germany before the Nazis took over but
the point is one of principal.
19 Ayelet Shachar, Dangerous Liaisons: Money and
Citizenship, in SHOULD CITIZENSHIP BE FOR SALE? 3
(Ayelet Shachar & Rainer Bauböck eds., EUI
Working Paper RSCAS 2014/01, European
University Institute, 2014).
20 For a distinction between a country as a “country
house,” a “hotel,” and a “home,” see JONATHAN SACKS,
THEHOMEWEBUILD TOGETHER: RECREATING SOCIETY
13 23 (2007).
21 See, e.g., Myron Weiner, Security, Stability, and
International Migration, 17 INT’L SECURITY 91
(1992 1993); Fiona B. Adamson, Crossing Borders:
International Migration and National Security, 31
INT’L SECURITY 165 (2006).
22 Spiro discusses this topic in a different place. See
Peter J. Spiro, The Equality Paradox of Dual
Citizenship, J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. (Mar.
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law of citizenship must consider the conse
quences of dual citizenship and ways of mitigat
ing global inequality, perhaps in the form of a
“privilege levy/tax,” an extra fee for the status
entitlement that will be contributed to global
causes, as suggested by Ayelet Shachar in a differ
ent context.23
Spiro’s book is rich and inspiring. It indicates
how arbitrary citizenship rules are and stimulates
a debate on the future of citizenship. It is time for
considering the propositions underlying the law
of citizenship at the international level and the
norms governing it. Spiro’s scholarship could
be and would be a cornerstone in this reshap
ing of international law.
LIAV ORGAD
European University Institute,
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya,
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
20, 2018), available at https://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1440485.
23 AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTH RIGHT LOTTERY:
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009).
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